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Abstract: In this paper we analyse the empirical performance of several preference functionals using individual 
and group data. Our investigation aims to address two fundamental questions that have, until now, not been 
addressed in literature. Specifically, we intend to assess if there exists a risky choice theory that statistically fits 
group decisions significantly better than alternative theories, and if there are significant differences between 
individual and group choices. Experimental findings reported in this paper provide answers to both questions 
showing that when risky choices are undertaken by small groups (dyads in our case), disappointment aversion 
outperforms several alternative preference functionals, including expected utility. Since expected utility typically 
emerged as the dominant model in individual risky choices, this finding suggests that differences between 
individual and group choices exist, showing that the preference aggregation process drives out EU. 
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1. Introduction 
Since its axiomatization by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), the expected utility theory 
(EUT) has been the dominant framework for analysing individual decision problems under 
risk and uncertainty. Starting with the well-known paradox of Allais (1953), however, a large 
body of experimental evidence, indicating that individuals systematically tend to violate the 
assumptions underlying EUT, was produced. This experimental evidence motivated 
researchers to develop alternative theories of choice under risk and uncertainty that were able 
to accommodate the observed patterns of behaviour. Nowadays a large number of alternative 
theories exist (e.g. regret theory, disappoint aversion, prospect theory, rank-dependent theory, 
etc.).1 Naturally, the question arises: Which theory can best explain observed choice 
behaviours? To address this question many experimentalists studied and compared the 
empirical performance of single alternatives. Most notable, this line of research was 
significantly advanced by Harless and Camerer (1994) and Hey and Orme (1994).  
All of the existing studies, we are aware of, use individual choice data in order to evaluate the 
alternatives.2 However, decision processes are not always individual, there are many 
circumstances where individuals make their decisions in groups. It is striking that neither the 
validity of expected utility3 nor the comparative performances of the single alternative 
theories of choice under risk and uncertainty have been systematically investigated with group 
decision. This paper therefore aims to fill this gap, presenting results of an experiment 
designed to address the following research questions: Is there a risky choice theory fits group 
decisions significantly better (in a statistical sense)? And, are there significant differences (in 
an economic sense) between individual and group choices? 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly presents the relevant 
literature on group decision and risk. Experimental design is discussed in section 3. Section 4 
explains the estimation procedure. Section 5 presents our experimental results and section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                            
1 See Starmer, 2000; Sugden, 2004 and Schmidt, 2004 for a comprehensive survey. 
2 See, among others, Carbone and Hey (1994, 1995), Morone (2008), Hey et al. (2009). 
3 Perhaps, it should be noted here that there are exceptions to this void in the literature. We will provide an 
account of this in the following section.  
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2. Risk and group decisions  
Recently, growing experimental literature has explored differences between individuals and 
groups (or between groups of different size) in various decision contexts involving strategic 
behaviours.4 
However, experimental investigations on non-strategic group risky choices are more scant. In 
fact, there is only limited evidence of group, as opposed to individual, behaviour. Earlier 
studies by Bone (1998) and Bone et al. (1999) provided some interesting results, suggesting 
that the common effects observed in the literature regarding EUT (the common ratio and 
preference reversal effects) are observable also in groups. 
More recently, Bateman and Munro (2005) provided results of an experiment designed to 
investigate to what extent decisions made by couples and decisions made separately by 
individuals (who are part of a couple) conform to EUT. The authors used established couples 
and presented them individually and jointly with decisions involving monetary payoffs, 
finding that joint choices are more risk averse than those made by individuals. Moreover, 
experimental findings showed that couples display the same anomalous patterns in their risky 
choices as are regularly recorded in individual choice experiments.  
Along this line of investigation, Shupp and Williams (2008) evaluate risk aversion using price 
data elicited by a willingness to pay mechanism for risky prospects. They find that the 
variance of risk preferences is generally smaller for groups than individuals and the average 
group is more risk averse than the average individual in high-risk situations, but groups tend 
to exhibit lower risk aversion than individuals in low-risk situations. 
Subsequently, commenting on the paper by Charness et al. (2007) that shows how salient 
group membership has a strong effect on individual decisions in coordination and prisoner’s 
dilemma games, Sutter (2009) demonstrated that their findings also apply to non-strategic 
decisions. By performing an investment experiment the author showed that individual 
decisions with salient group membership are largely the same as team decisions; a finding that 
helps bridge the literature on team decision-making and on group membership effects. 
Finally, Masclet et al. (2009) conducted a field experiment (recruiting salaried and self-
employed workers) and explored individual and group decisions under risk and uncertainty. 
The authors found that groups are more likely than individuals to choose safe lotteries and 
                                                            
4 Beauty-contest games (Kocher and Sutter, 2005; Kocher et al., 2007; Sutter, 2005), centipede games (Bornstein 
et al., 2004), ultimatum games (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998), dictator games (Cason and Mui, 1997), signalling 
games (Cooper and Kagel, 2005), policy decisions (Blinder and Morgan, 2005), location and pricing (Barreda et 
al., 2002), and auctions (Cox and Hayne, 2006; Sutter et al., 2009). 
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that individuals risk attitude is correlated with the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
participant to the experiment (namely, the type and the sector of employment). 
Although very relevant, none of these studies attempts to compare EU and non-EU theories of 
risky choices. In fact, the field of risky choice has extensively investigated individual decision 
processes under risk and uncertainty, expending much effort to scrutinize EUT and proposing 
many alternatives that should, in principle better accommodate individual choice anomalies 
typically observed in empirical assessments. However, as mentioned in the introduction, there 
is a void in the literature in assessing alternative theories when it comes to group choices. 
Moving on from this, we report hereafter on the first economic experiment that attempts to fit 
EU preference functional and a number of its generalizations to group decisions and compare 
their relative performance.  
 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment presented here closely follows that of Hey and Orme’s (1994). We recruited 
students from the University of Bari via a mailing-list system. They were presented with a set of 
pairwise choice questions; each pairwise choice is composed of two lotteries, labelled 
“Lottery A” and “Lottery B”, of the kind depicted in Figure 1. Each subject has to report 
his/her preference between the two lotteries.5 
 
Figure 1: The Presentation of Lotteries 
  
Lottery A Lottery B 
 
                                                            
5 Note that we are deliberately not allowing subjects to express indifference between lotteries. This simplifies our 
data analysis since, if subjects are given the opportunity to express indifference and take advantage of this 
opportunity, it is not obvious how one should treat such responses (see Hey, 2001). Moreover, this choice does 
not affect the value of the experiment to the subjects, since if subjects are truly indifferent it does not matter how 
they respond, given the adopted incentive mechanism. 
12.5%&
175€&
87.5%&
125€&
12.5%&
75€&
87.5%&
175€&
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The experiment was conducted at the ESSE laboratory of experimental economics at the 
University of Bari in November 2008 with 38 participants. Each participant attended two 
separate and subsequent sessions: in Session 1 subjects played individually, in Session 2 they 
played in randomly created groups of two6. 
In each session participants were presented with the same 100 pairwise choice lotteries (reported 
in Table A1, in Appendix 1). The time taken to complete each session varied between the two 
sessions and also across subjects, since participants were explicitly encouraged to proceed at 
their own pace.7 The incentive mechanism was that the chosen lottery would be played for 
real. Specifically, whenever a group completed Session 2, one question was randomly selected 
for each subject (from both sessions) and played out for real. The average payment made to the 
38 subjects over these two sessions was €97.50; the maximum payment to any subject was 
€175 and the minimum €25. Consequently, the average payment was around €83.6 per hour 
spent doing the experiments. This is considerably above the marginal wage rate of the subjects 
performing the experiment. 
 
4. Estimation procedure and preference functionals  
As mentioned earlier, our study closely follows that of Hey and Orme’s (1994), whose analysis 
is grounded on two fundamental observations. First, there is not necessarily one best preference 
functional for all subjects, but the behaviour of different subjects may be explained best by 
different functionals. Second, subjects make errors from time to time in their responses, which 
demand a stochastic specification of preference functionals for our empirical test. To take into 
account the first observation, we estimated each model subject by subject. To take into account 
the second observation, we added an error term to each preference functional assuming that 
errors are identically and independently distributed among subjects and questions. 
 
4.1 Some notes on estimation techniques  
Let’s indicate the two lotteries in the pairwise choice by A and B; then, assuming that there is no 
noise or error in the subject’s responses, she/he will report a preference for A, if and only if 
EU(A) >  EU(B) – that is, if and only if E[u(A) - u(B)] > 0. However, as we know from the 
existing literature, subjects’ responses are typically affected by noise. If we denote this noise or 
                                                            
6 We are aware that there are many factors that can affect group decisions (e.g. gender, age, placement of group 
members). Additionally, the social interaction between a man and a woman can be quite different than between 
two men or two women.  For instance, "beauty" and other stereotypes can have huge impact on the outcomes of 
group decisions (Andreoni and Petrie, 2008). To minimise the impact of such problems, we kept the pairs 
identity confidential so that each group member maintained anonymity with subjects communicating through the 
computer interface. 
7 The required time to complete one session was between 85 and 55 minutes. 
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measurement error by 𝜖, then the subject will report a preference for A if, and only if, E[u(A) - 
u(B)] + 𝜖 >  0, that is, if and only if 𝜖 >  E[u(B) - u(A)]. Following this line of reasoning, we can 
now write the probability that the subject reports a preference for A as: Prob{𝜖 > E[u(B) - 
u(A)]}.8  
Having determined the actual reported preferences, we then proceed to the estimation of the 
parameters using maximum likelihood methods. To do so, we need to specify the distribution of 
the measurement error, which we shall assume to be normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance s. As noted by Hey and Orme (1994), the magnitude of s measures the noisiness of the 
subject’s responses: if s = 0, then the subject makes no mistakes. As s increases, the noise also 
increases. As s approaches infinity, there is no information content in the subject’s responses. 
Note that when estimating an utility function from an experiment, there are two usual 
approaches: (a) to assume a particular functional form and estimate the parameters of that form; 
(b) to estimate the utility at the various outcome values used in the experiment. In our estimation 
we follow the latter technique.  
 
4.2 The preference functionals 
In the experiment reported here there were four outcome values (€25, €75, €125, and €175), 
which we denote by x1, x2, x3 and x4.9 Let x = {x1, x2, x3, x4} be the vector of outcomes. Since we 
used a pairwise choice gamble to derive preference statements, our data involved two lotteries 
represented by two probability vectors denoted by p = {p1, p2, p3, p4} and q = {q1, q2, q3, q4}. Let 
W denote the subject’s preference functional and V(p, q) = W(p)-W(q) the relative evaluation or 
net preference functional. All those subjects who exhibit a positive net preference functional (i.e. 
V(p, q) > 0) strictly prefer lottery A over lottery B. Conversely, all those subjects who exhibit a 
negative net preference functional (i.e. V(p, q) < 0) strictly prefer lottery B over lottery A. 
Finally, if V(p, q) = 0, then subjects are indifferent between the two lotteries.  
As mentioned earlier, subjects state their preferences with some error; hence have: 𝑉∗ 𝒑,𝒒 =𝑉 𝒑,𝒒 + 𝜖, where 𝜖 is the error term. As mentioned above, 𝜖 is normally distributed with mean 
0 and variance s; introducing a further normalization we can put s = 1 hence obtaining 𝜖  is  𝑁(0, 𝑠).10 
                                                            
8 Note that the probability that the subject reports a preference for B can be derived accordingly.   
9 Note that for the estimation of parameters we follow Hey and Orme (1994). The theoretical foundation of the 
employed estimation technique can be found in Orme (1995).   
10 As observed by Hey and Orme (1994: 1301), an alternative procedure would be, in addition to u(x1) = 0, to put 
u(x4) = 1 and then specify the error variance to be 𝜎!; in this case one should estimate 𝜎 in addition to u(x2) and 
u(x3). Choosing instead to put the error variance equal to unity we will estimate u(x2), u(x3), and u(x4). The two 
procedures are highly comparable, the main difference being in interpreting the results: other things being equal, 
under our procedure, a subject who makes relatively small errors will have relatively large values for u(x2), u(x3), 
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The first model we estimate is risk neutrality, given by 𝐑𝐍:  𝑉∗ 𝒑,𝒒 = 𝑘 𝑝! − 𝑞! 𝑥! + 𝜖!!!! . 
In this model we have to estimate only the parameter k, which is the relative magnitude of 
subjects’ errors.  
The second model we estimate is expected utility, given by 𝐄𝐔:  𝑉∗ 𝒑,𝒒 = 𝑝! −!!!!𝑞!   𝑢 𝑥! + 𝜖.    We normalized u(x1) to zero, and the variance of the error term to unity. We did 
the same also for the alternative theories presented below. 
The third model is the theory of disappointment aversion introduced by Gul (1991). The main 
psychological motivation of this theory is the hypothesis that choice behaviour tries to avoid the 
disappointment that would result if the actual outcome of the lottery were lower than the 
certainty equivalent. In our framework, disappointment aversion is characterized as follows 
D𝐀:  𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪   =   𝑚𝑖𝑛!!!! !!! !!! !! ! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! − !!! !!! !! ! !!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!! !!!!!!!! + 𝜖. 
Note that β is an additional parameter, which determines the degree of disappointment aversion. 
If β = 0, then DA reduces to EU. Our characterization initially appears different from that of Hey 
and Orme’s (1994), but it can be shown that they are identical (see Appendix 2). 
The fourth model is rank-dependent expected utility theory, which is nowadays the most 
prominent alternative to EU. We estimate two variants of rank-dependent utility, one with a 
power weighting function and one with the weighting function proposed by Quiggin (1982).  
For rank-dependence with power function the weighting function w is given by w(r) = rγ and we 
have 𝐑𝐏:  𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪 = 𝑢 𝑥! 𝑝!!!!! ! − 𝑝!!!!!!! ! 𝑞!!!!! ! − 𝑞!!!!!!! !!!!! +ϵ. Note that if γ = 1, then RP reduces to EU.  
For rank-dependence with “Quiggin” weighting function (Quiggin, 1982), the weighting 
function is given by w(r) = rγ / [rγ + (1 – r)γ]1/γ, which yields  
𝐑𝐐:  𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪 = 𝑢 𝑥! !!!!!! !!!!!!! !! !! !!!!!! ! ! ! − !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !! !! !!!!!!!! ! ! ! −!!!!
!!!!!! !!!!!!! !! !! !!!!!! ! ! ! − !!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!! !! !! !!!!!!!! ! ! ! + ϵ.  Note that RQ reduces to EU if 
γ = 1.11 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and u(x4), while a subject who makes relatively large errors will have relatively small values for u(x2), u(x3), and 
u(x4). Under the alternative procedure, the relatively careful subject would have a relatively small value for 𝜎. 
11 We also estimated Prospective Reference Theory and Weighted Utility Theory. Consistent with existing 
literature, we found that they fit the experimental data very poorly. Therefore we decided not to include them in 
this paper; results are available upon request. 
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5. Results 
As we stated in the introduction, what we are trying to understand here is if there is a theory 
of risky choice that fits group decisions significantly better than the alternatives, and if there 
are significant differences among individual and group choice. In order to address the first of 
these two questions, we used the Akaike information criterion to provide a ranking of the 
various functionals.  
Following Hey and Orme (1994), and provided that we always have the same number of 
observations across all models, the corrected-log-likelihood Akaike information criterion 
(CAIC) can be written as 𝐶𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿 𝛼 − 𝑘; where 𝐿 𝛼  is the maximized likelihood for a 
particular estimated preference functional and k is the number of estimated parameters in that 
functional. The smaller CAIC is, the better the model will be. 
We report rankings for individual and group treatments in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. 
In the last column of these two tables we also report the average rankings, averaged over all 
subjects (of course, the smaller this value is, the better the model will be).  
 
Table 1: Performance (%) of the five preference functionals based on individual data 
  
Rank Average 
Rank 
  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Pr
efe
ren
ce
 
Fu
nc
tio
na
l RN 0.237 0.026 0.053 0.000 0.684 3.868 
EU 0.211 0.184 0.368 0.211 0.026 2.657 
DA 0.263 0.237 0.132 0.289 0.079 2.684 
RP 0.131 0.316 0.210 0.211 0.132 2.897 
RQ 0.158 0.237 0.237 0.289 0.079 2.894 
 
Table 1 suggests that EU is, overall, the best performing model on this criterion and that DA is a 
reasonably close second best. Moreover, rank-dependent models (both with the Quiggin 
weighting function and with the power weighting function) do fairly well; conversely, RN is the 
worst performing model. The reader should be cautioned that average values hide a considerable 
variation across subjects,12 which can be partially unveiled by looking at the percentage values of 
each rank position. Specifically, we can observe that DA ranks first with 26.3% of the cases and 
either first or second in half of the cases. This makes DA the winner on this criterion. Consistent 
with earlier findings obtained by Hey and Orme (1994), we can conclude that, when looking at 
risky choices undertaken individually, expected utility theory also emerges “fairly intact” in our 
analysis. 
                                                            
12 As pointed out by Hey and Orme (1994), when interpreting such rankings one should keep in mind that 
average results counter the idea that subjects are different and have different preference functionals. 
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When looking at group data (see Table 2), the emerging picture is partially different. Now, the 
best performing model is disappointment aversion, RQ ranks second and expected utility ranks 
only third. Decomposing the average rank as we did above, we can observe that DA ranks first 
with 36.8% of the cases and either first or second in almost 70% of the cases. This makes DA the 
absolute winner in the group treatment. This finding answers our first question: Disappointment 
aversion fits group data significantly better than any other theory, including expected utility.  
 
Table 2: Performance (%) of the five preference functionals based on group data 
  
Rank Average 
Rank 
  
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
Pr
efe
ren
ce
 
Fu
nc
tio
na
l RN 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.105 0.737 4.423 
EU 0.211 0.158 0.316 0.211 0.105 2.844 
DA 0.368 0.316 0.158 0.158 0.000 2.106 
RP 0.211 0.105 0.211 0.316 0.158 3.108 
RQ 0.158 0.368 0.263 0.211 0.000 2.527 
 
Hence, when it comes to group decisions, DA outperforms EU; a result that did not occur with 
individual decision data. Consequently, this also contributes towards answering our second 
question, suggesting that there are significant differences between individual and group choice. 
To further validate these finding, we shall perform two other tests. First, we will compare the 
performance of alternative models with EU (Table 3) using again the CAIC; then we will 
perform a likelihood ratio test to test the superiority of alternatives with respect to EU (Table 4). 
 
Table 3: Performance (%) of alternative models w.r.t. the EU model 
  
  Individuals Groups 
EU vs. DA 0.500 0.260 
EU vs. RP 0.550 0.530 
EU vs. RQ 0.550 0.470 
 
Table 3 reports pair comparisons and shows that EU outperforms alternative models in half or 
more of the cases when referring to individuals’ treatment. This percentage is quite stable when 
comparing EU with RP and RQ in groups’ treatment, but it drops to 26% when we compare EU 
with DA. This result corroborates our earlier finding regarding the superiority of the DA model 
when it comes to group risky decisions.  
 
Recall now that DA, RP and RQ are all generalizations of EU, in the sense that the latter is a 
special case of each of the former. Hence, we refer to them as higher-level models when 
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compared to EU. Moving down from higher levels to lower levels involves parameter 
restrictions. In the context of this experiment, going from DA, RP and RQ to EU always 
involves one parameter restriction. Accordingly, we can use standard likelihood ratio tests to 
investigate whether the higher level functionals fit significantly better than the lower level 
functionals, by which we mean that the parameter restrictions that reduce the higher-level 
functional to the lower-level functional are rejected at the appropriate significance level. 
 
Table 4: Likelihood ratio tests for the superiority of higher-level models 
      
Alternative Functionals vs. Expected Utility 
 
Percentage of subjects for whom test significant at  
 5%  1% 
  Individuals Groups   Individuals Groups 
DA 0.316 0.474 
 
0.158 0.053 
RP 0.237 0.263 
 
0.132 0.105 
RQ 0.237 0.316   0.105 0.000 
 
Table 4 reports the results of carrying out such tests at two levels of significance (i.e. 5% and 
1%). Most notably, this test shows that, at the 5% level, EU is rejected in favour of DA for 
considerably more subjects on the group treatment than on individual treatment. Moreover, the 
percentage of times EU is rejected in favour of one of the alternatives always grows as we move 
from individuals to groups. This suggests that the preference aggregation process drives out 
EU.13 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we analysed the empirical performance of several preference functionals using 
individual and group data. Our investigation aimed at addressing two fundamental questions 
never addressed before in the literature. Specifically, we intended to assess if there exists a risky 
choice theory fits group decisions significantly better (in a statistical sense) than alternative 
theories, and if there are significant differences (in an economic sense) between individual and 
group choices. As we believe, we succeeded to provide answers to both questions showing that 
when risky choices are undertaken by small groups (dyads in our case), disappointment aversion 
outperformed several alternative preference functionals. Most notably, this handful of 
alternatives included expected utility, which typically emerged as the dominant model in 
individual risky choices. This latter finding suggests that differences exist between individual 
                                                            
13 Noteworthy, at the 1% level of significance we are not able to reject EU in favour of one of the top-level 
functionals in the majority of the cases. 
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and group choices, showing that the preference aggregation process drives out EU. Hence, we 
can conclude that even if subjects are EU, small groups are not. 
As a concluding remark, we would like to caution the reader on a critical point: Although 
relevant, these aggregate findings hide a considerable variation across subjects as well as groups, 
suggesting that groups are different as much as people are different. Therefore it is hard to find a 
preference functional that clearly wins all alternatives. More likely, we can find (as we indeed 
found) a functional that better fits group data, always bearing in mind the underlying 
heterogeneities.  
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Appendix 1 
Table A1: The 100 Pairwise Choice Questions 
Question  
Number 
Lottery A Lottery B 
p1 p2 p3 p4 q1 q2 q3 q4 
1 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .000 .875 
2 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .000 .875 
3 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .125 .500 .375 
4 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .000 .625 
5 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .125 .500 
6 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .375 .250 .375 
7 .000 .000 .875 .125 .000 .625 .000 .375 
8 .000 .125 .500 .375 .000 .375 .000 .625 
9 .000 .125 .500 .375 .000 .375 .125 .500 
10 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .000 .625 
11 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500 
12 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375 
13 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125 
14 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .000 .375 
15 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .125 
16 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .000 .625 
17 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500 
18 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375 
19 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125 
20 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .375 .500 .125 
21 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .625 .000 .375 
22 .000 .250 .750 .000 .000 .875 .000 .125 
23 .000 .375 .500 .125 .000 .625 .000 .375 
24 .000 .125 .875 .000 .000 .250 .750 .000 
25 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000 .375 .250 .375 
26 .000 .000 .500 .500 .125 .000 .250 .625 
27 .000 .000 .500 .500 .125 .000 .250 .625 
28 .000 .000 .875 .125 .125 .000 .250 .625 
29 .000 .000 .875 .125 .125 .000 .625 .250 
30 .000 .000 .875 .125 .375 .000 .375 .250 
31 .000 .000 .875 .125 .500 .000 .000 .500 
32 .000 .000 .875 .125 .750 .000 .000 .250 
33 .000 .000 .100 .000 .125 .000 .250 .625 
34 .000 .000 .100 .000 .125 .000 .625 .250 
35 .000 .000 .100 .000 .375 .000 .375 .250 
36 .000 .000 .100 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500 
37 .000 .000 .100 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250 
38 .000 .000 .100 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250 
39 .000 .000 .100 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125 
40 .125 .000 .625 .250 .500 .000 .000 .500 
41 .250 .000 .750 .000 .375 .000 .375 .250 
42 .250 .000 .750 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500 
43 .250 .000 .750 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250 
44 .250 .000 .750 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125 
45 .375 .000 .375 .250 .500 .000 .000 .500 
46 .375 .000 .625 .000 .500 .000 .000 .500 
47 .375 .000 .625 .000 .750 .000 .000 .250 
48 .375 .000 .625 .000 .750 .000 .125 .125 
49 .250 .000 .750 .000 .375 .000 .625 .000 
50 .750 .000 .000 .250 .750 .000 .125 .125 
51 .000 .750 .000 .250 .250 .375 .000 .375 
52 .000 .750 .000 .250 .375 .125 .000 .500 
53 .000 .750 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375 
54 .000 .875 .000 .125 .250 .375 .000 .375 
55 .000 .875 .000 .125 .375 .125 .000 .500 
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56 .000 .875 .000 .125 .500 .250 .000 .250 
57 .000 .875 .000 .125 .625 .000 .000 .375 
58 .000 .875 .000 .125 .625 .125 .000 .250 
59 .125 .750 .000 .125 .250 .375 .000 .375 
60 .125 .750 .000 .125 .375 .125 .000 .500 
61 .125 .750 .000 .125 .500 .250 .000 .250 
62 .125 .750 .000 .125 .625 .000 .000 .375 
63 .125 .750 .000 .125 .625 .125 .000 250 
64 .125 .875 .000 .000 .250 .375 .000 .375 
65 .125 .875 .000 .000 .375 .125 .000 .500 
66 .125 .875 .000 .000 .500 .250 .000 .250 
67 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .000 .000 .375 
68 .125 .875 .000 .000 .625 .125 .000 .250 
69 .125 .875 .000 .000 .750 .125 .000 .125 
70 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .000 .125 
71 .125 .875 .000 .000 .875 .000 .000 .125 
72 .250 .375 .000 .375 .375 .125 .000 .500 
73 .500 .250 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375 
74 .500 .250 .000 .250 .625 .000 .000 .375 
75 .000 .750 .000 .250 .125 .750 .000 .125 
76 .000 .750 .250 .000 .125 .000 .875 .000 
77 .000 .750 .250 .000 .125 .375 .500 .000 
78 .000 .750 .250 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000 
79 .000 .750 .250 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000 
80 .000 .750 .250 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
81 .000 .750 .250 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000 
82 .000 .100 .000 .000 .125 .000 .875 .000 
83 .000 .100 .000 .000 .125 .375 .500 .000 
84 .000 .100 .000 .000 .250 .625 .125 .000 
85 .000 .100 .000 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000 
86 .000 .100 .000 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000 
87 .000 .100 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
88 .000 .100 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
89 .000 .100 .000 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000 
90 .000 .100 .000 .000 .750 .125 .125 .000 
91 .250 .625 .125 .000 .375 .125 .500 .000 
92 .250 .625 .125 .000 .375 .250 .375 .000 
93 .250 .625 .125 .000 .500 .000 500 .000 
94 .250 .625 .125 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000 
95 .375 .250 .375 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
96 .375 .250 .375 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
97 .375 .625 .000 .000 .500 .000 .500 .000 
98 .375 .625 .000 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000 
99 .375 .625 .000 .000 .750 .125 .125 .000 
100 .375 .125 .500 .000 .500 .125 .375 .000 
Note: Lottery A takes the values x1, x2, x3 and x4 with respective probabilities p1, p2, p3 and p4 and Lottery B takes the 
values x1, x2, x3 and x4 with respective probabilities q1, q2, q3 and q4. The x vector takes the value (€25, €75, €125, 
€175). 
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Appendix 2 
Derivation of Disappoint Aversion specification. 
Let start with our formulation of Disappointment Aversion Theory, as reported in the paper DA:  𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪   =   𝑚𝑖𝑛!!!! 1+ 𝛽 𝑝!𝑢 𝑥! + 𝑝!𝑢 𝑥!!!!!!!!!!!!!1+ 𝛽 𝑝!!!!!!!− 1+ 𝛽 𝑞!𝑢 𝑥! + 𝑞!𝑢 𝑥!!!!!!!!!!!!!1+ 𝛽 𝑞!!!!!!!!! + 𝜖 
if 𝑗 = 0   ⇒ 𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪   =    !!! !!! !! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! − !!! !!! !! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! + 𝜖 
if 𝑗 = 1   ⇒ 𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪   =    !!! !!! !!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!! − !!! !!! !!! !!!!!!!!! !!!!!! + 𝜖 If  𝑗 = 2   ⇒ 𝑉∗ 𝐩,𝐪   =    𝑝!𝑢 𝑥!!!!!1+ 𝛽𝑝! − 𝑞!𝑢 𝑥!!!!!1+ 𝛽𝑞! + 𝜖 
 
Now, taking the minimum we obtain exactly the same formulation proposed by Hey and 
Orme (1994: 1297). 
 
 
